

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
R E C O R D O F P R O C E E D I N G S

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) Diary No(s). 28287/2018
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 12-10-2017
in WP No. 1726/2001 passed by the High Court of Judicature At
Bombay)

THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

ST. XAVIER'S COLLEGE & ORS.

Respondent(s)

WITH DIARY No(s). 23418/2018 (IX)

Date : 13-07-2018 These petitions were called on for hearing today.

UDRAM = HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KURIAN JOSEPH
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KISHAN KAIL

For Petitioner(s)

Mr. P.S. Narsimha, ASG
Mr. Navin Prakash, AOR
Mr. Rui Rodrigues, Adv.
Ms. Neelu Singh, Adv.
Mr. Rahul Tamhane, Adv.
Mr. V.C. Shukla, Adv.

Mr. Atmaram N.S. Wadkarni, ASG
Mr. Nishant Ramakantna Kutneahwarkar, AOR

For Respondent(s)

Mr. Darius Khambata, Sr. Adv.
Mr. C. Rashmi Kant, Adv.
Mr. Mahesh Agarwal, Adv.
Mr. Rishi Agrawala, Adv.
Mr. Ankur Saigal, Adv.
Mr. Jay Chhabaria, Adv.
Ms. Gunika Gupta, Adv.
Mr. E.C. Agrawala, AOR

UPON hearing the counsel the COURT made the following
O R D E R

Delay condoned.

We find no reason to entertain these special leave petitions,
which are, accordingly, dismissed.

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

(NARENDRA PRASAD)
COURT MASTER

(RENU DIWAN)
ASSISTANT REGISTRAR

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

NOTICE OF MOTION NO.08 OF 2013
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 1535 OF 2013

Maharashtra Association of Minority
Education Institutions & Am

.. Applicants /
.. Petitioners

IN THE MATTER OF :-

Maharashtra Association of Minority
Education Institutions & Am

.. Petitioners

V/s

The State of Maharashtra & Ors.

.. Respondents

Ms. Anu Dhony, Senior Counsel with Mr. Gaurav Jais, Mr. Piyush
Rathwa, Mr. Jai Chhabria and Mr. R.P. Cavathia /w Ms. Federal &
Reshmikant for the Petitioners.

Ms. Geeta Shastri, Additional Government Pleader for the State -
Respondent Nos. 1 and 2

Mr. Rui Rodrigues for Respondent Nos. 3 and 4

CORAM : S.J. VAZIFDAR &

R.Y. GANQO, JJ.

DATE : 24TH APRIL, 2013.

P.C. :-

1. The above writ petition was filed on 05.07.2012. By an
order dated 01.11.2012, the Division Bench directed it to be placed
for final hearing on 13.12.2012. We would normally not have

enjoined the issue of action for interim relief and would have directed the parties to await the final hearing of the writ petition itself. We are however satisfied that during the interim period even the day to day functioning of the personnel members who are minority education institutions is being considerably hampered and prejudiced. As the petitioners have a strong *prima-facie* case in view of several judgments of the Supreme Court and a judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in respect of the provisions impugned in the petition, we have granted the interim reliefs sought. Moreover the conditions, which we have imposed protect the respondents' interests in the event of the petition being dismissed.

2. The petitioners have essentially sought a declaration that Government Resolutions dated 11/02/2011 and 30/01/2012 and a University Circular dated 22/02/2012 are ultra-vires the Constitution of India and are not applicable to minority institutions covered by Article 30 of the Constitution of India. The petitioners have made out more than just a strong *prima-facie* case that the impugned provisions impinge upon the rights of their members – minority aided institutions – to appoint principals and teachers of their choice.

3. In force prior to the impugned G. Os and the circular were Statute Nos.123 and 117 dated 14/08/1988 issued by respondent No.2 – University of Mumbai. They prescribed the mode and manner

of the appointment of principals and the selection of teachers in colleges. The proviso to each of the statutes however, provided that the colleges established and administered by the minority managements covered by Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India could form their own selection committees and the provisions of the Statutes would not be applicable to their cases.

4. On 30.06.2010, Respondent No.3 – University Grants Commission by supersession of the Regulations of 2009 framed the University Grants Commission (Minimum qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and other Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education) Regulations, 2010. The petitioners have challenged Regulations 5.1.4, 5.1.5 and 5.1.6 thereof, which read as under :-

5.1.4 Assistant Professor in Colleges including Private Colleges:

(a) The Section Committee for the post of Assistant Professor in Colleges including Private College shall have the following composition:-

1. Chairperson of the Governing Body of the college or his/her nominee from among the members of the Governing Body to be the Chairperson of the Selection Committee
2. The Principal of the College
3. Head of the Department of the concerned subject in the College

4. Two nominees of the Vice Chancellor of the affiliating university of whom one should be a subject expert. In case of colleges notified/declared as minority educational institutions, two nominees of the Chairperson of the college from out of a panel of five names, preferably from minority communities, recommended by the Vice Chancellor of the affiliating university from the list of experts suggested by the relevant statutory body of the college, of whom one should be a subject expert.

5. Two subject experts not connected with the college to be nominated by the Chairperson of the governing body of the college out of a panel of five names recommended by the Vice Chancellor from the list of subject experts approved by the relevant statutory body of the university concerned. In case of colleges notified/declared as minority educational institutions, two subject experts not connected with the University to be nominated by the Chairperson of the Government Body of the college out of the panel of five names, preferably from minority communities, recommended by the Vice Chancellor from the list of subject experts approved by the relevant statutory body of the college.

6. An academician representing SC/ST/OBC/Minority/Women/ Differently-abled categories if any of candidates representing these categories is the applicant, to be nominated by the Vice Chancellor, if any of the above members of the selection committee do not belong to this category.

(B) To constitute the quorum for the meeting, five of which at least two must be from out of the three subject-experts shall be present.

(C) For all levels of teaching positions in Government colleges, the State Public Services Commission / Teaching Recruitment Boards must invite those subject experts for which the concerned University, be involved in the selection process by the State PSC.

(d) For all levels of teaching positions in constituent college(s) of a university, the selection committee norms shall be similar to that of the posts of departments of the university.

5.1.5 Associate Professor in Colleges including Private Colleges

(a) The Selection Committee for the post of Associate Professor in Colleges including Private Colleges shall have the following composition:

1. The Chairperson of the Governing Body or his or her nominee from among the members of the Governing body to be the Chairperson of the Selection Committee.

2. The Principal of the College.

3. The head of the Department of the concerned subject from the college.

4. Two University representatives nominated by the Vice-Chancellor, one of whom will be the Dean of College Development Critical or equivalent position in the University, and the other must be expert in the concerned subject. In case of College notified/declared as minority educational institutions, two nominees of the Chairperson of the College from out of a panel of five names, preferably from minority communities, recommended by the Vice-Chancellor of the affliating university from the list of experts suggested by the relevant statutory body of the college of whom one should be a subject expert.

5. Two subject-experts will be contacted with the college to be nominated by the Chairperson of the governing body of the college out of a good panel of five names recommended by the Vice-Chancellor from the list of subject experts approved by the relevant statutory body of the university concerned. In case of colleges notified/declared as minority educational institutions, two subject experts will

connected with the University to be nominated by the Chairperson of the Governing Body of the College out of the panel of five names preferably from minority communities recommended by the Vice-Chancellor from the list of subject experts approved by the relevant statutory body of the College.

ii. An academican representing SC/ST/OBC/ minority/Women/Differently-abled categories, if any of candidates representing these categories is the applicant, to be nominated by the Vice-Chancellor, if any of the above members of the selection committee do not belong to that category.

(b) The quorum for the meeting should be five of which not less than must be from out of the three subject-experts.

5.1.6 College Principal

(a) The Selection Committee for the post of College Principal shall have the following composition:

1. Chairperson of the Governing Body as Chairperson.

2. Two members of the Governing Body of the college to be nominated by the Chairperson of whom one shall be an expert in academic administration.

3. One nominee of the Vice-Chancellor who shall be a Higher Education expert. In case of Colleges notified/declared as minority educational institution, one nominee of the Chairperson of the College from out of a panel of five names, preferably from minority communities recommended by the Vice-Chancellor of the affiliating university of whom one should be a subject expert.

4. Three experts consisting of the Principal of a college, a Professor and an accomplished educationalist not below the rank of a Professor (to be nominated by the Governing Body of the college) out

of a panel of six experts approved by the relevant statutory body of the university concerned.

5. An academician representing CAST/OBC/Minority/Women/ Differently-abled categories, if any of candidates representing these categories is the applicant, to be nominated by the Vice-Chancellor. If any of the above members of the selection committee do not belong to that category.

(ii) At least five members, including two experts, should constitute the forum.

(c) All the selection procedures of the selection committee shall be completed on the day of the selection committee meeting itself, wherein, minutes are recorded along with the scoring protocol and recommendation made on the basis of merit with the list of selected and waitlisted candidates. Panel of names in order of merit, duly signed by all members of the selection committee.

(d) The term of appointment of the college principal shall be FIVE years with eligibility for reappointment for one more term only after a similar selection committee process.

5. On 05.01.2011, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court decided the case of *Forum of Minority Institutions and Associations vs. State of T.N.*, [2011] 2 M.L.J. 641. We will refer to the judgment in detail later. Suffice it to now at this stage that in that case the petitioners had challenged the 2000 Regulations. The Division Bench, however, noted in detail the 2011 Regulations and reasoned that the same had also been challenged. After referring to the judgments, some of which we will also refer to, the Division Bench declared that the impugned Regulations for violation of the

selection committees shall not be applied to the vacancy institutions, and issued a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to approve the selection made by the vacancy institutions without reference to clause 3 of the 2000 Regulations subject to the inherent conditions having the prescribed qualifications, experience etc.

(A) By paragraph 3 of the impugned G.R. dated 15.12.2011, respondent No.1 passed an order accepting therein the above recommendations and directives contained in the UGC notification dated 30.06.2010 without any change.

(B) The impugned G.R. Dated 30.03.2012 provided inter-alia as follows:-

“4. In view of the facts mentioned in above Paragraph, Government is taking decision as under:-

(1) As per University Grants Commission's Notification dated 30.6.2010, in the Selection Committee prescribed for selection of teachers/Principals in Non-agricultural Universities, Colleges and Institutions and in the Selection Committee prescribed for Career Advancement Scheme (CAS) concerned Joint Director of Education to include in Government representative.

(2) Selection of Teachers in the absence of Government Representative to be held as invalid

(3) Regional Joint Director of Education should remain present in person for meetings of Selection Committee. Under exceptional circumstances, a representative nominated by the Regional Joint Director of Education may remain present for the meeting.

(4) Points mentioned in the Government Circular dated 15.1.2001 in this regard be sincly followed

(5) This Government Resolution has been made available on Government of Maharashtra web site - www.maharashtra.gov.in and its order number is 20120131044045145001.

(C) By the impugned circular dated 22.02.2012, the University of Mumbai - respondent No.4 informed all the Principals about the G.R. dated 30.01.2012.

7. McDonry, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners members submitted that the above provisions impinge upon the rights of the petitioners members to select candidates of their choice.

8. In *T.M.A. Poo Foundation v. State of Karnataka*, (2002) 8 SCC 481, at page 557, a bench of 11 learned Judges of the Supreme Court referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court in *Amritlal St. Xavier's College Society v. State of Gujarat* (1974) 1 SCC 717 held as under:-

115. While considering the right of the religious and linguistic minorities to administer their educational institutions, it was observed by Ray, C.J., at SCR p. 194, as follows: (SCC no. 745-46, para 19)

"The right to administer is said to consist of two principal matters. First is the right to choose its managing or governing body. It is said that the founders of the minority institution have faith and

confidence in their own committee or body consisting of persons elected by them. Second is the right to choose its teachers. It is said that minority institutions want practices to have compatibility with the ideals, aims and aspirations of the institution. ———

121. After referring to the earlier cases, attention is the appointment of teachers. It was cited by Khanna, J., that the conclusion which followed was that a law which interfered with a minority's choice of qualified teachers or its disciplinary control over teachers and other members of the staff of the institution, was void as it was violative of Article 30(1). While it was permissible for the State and its educational authorities to prescribe the qualifications of teachers, if was held that once the teachers possessing the requisite qualifications were selected by the minorities for their educational institutions, the State would have no right to veto the selection of those teachers. The selection and appointment of teachers by an educational institution was regarded as one of the essential ingredients under Article 30(1). The Court's attention was drawn to the fact that in *Kerala Education Bill, 1957* case 1959 SCR 995, the Court had opined that clauses 11 and 12 made it obligatory for all aided schools to select teachers from a panel selected from each district by the Public Service Commission and that no teacher of an aided school could be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank without the previous sanction of the authorized officer. At SCC p. 792 Khanna, J., observed that in cases subsequent to the opinion in *Kerala Education Bill, 1957* case the Court had held similar provisions as clause 11 and clause 12 to be violative of Article 30(1) (sic in the case) of the minority institutions. He then observed as follows (SCC p. 792, para 105):

"The opinion expressed by this Court in the Kerala Education Bill, 1957 was of an advisory character and though great weight should be attracted to it because of its persuasive value, the said opinion cannot override the opinion subsequently expressed by this Court in contested cases. It is the law declared by the

Grant in the subsequent concerned cases which would have a binding effect. The words as at present advised as well as the preceding sentence indicate that the view expressed by the Court in *Re Kerala Education Bill, 1957* in this respect was hesitant and tentative and not a final view in the matter.

143. The means that the right under Article 30(1) implies that any grant that is given by the State to the minority institution cannot have such conditions attached to it which will in any way dilute or abridge the rights of the minority institution to establish and administer that institution. The conditions that can normally be permitted to be imposed on the educational institutions receiving the grant must be related to the proper utilization of the grant and attainment of the objectives of the grant. Any such secular conditions so long as such as a proper use will (regard to the utilization of the funds and the manner in which the funds are to be utilized) will be applicable and would not dilute the minority status of the educational institutions. Such conditions would be valid if they are also imposed on other educational institutions receiving the grant.

Q.5. (c) Whether the statutory provisions which regulate the aspects of administration like control over educational agencies, control over governing bodies, conditions of affiliation including recognition/withdrawal thereof and appointment of staff, employees, teachers and principals including their service conditions and (equation of fees, etc.) would interfere with the right of administration of minorities?

A. So far as the statutory provisions regarding the facets of administration are concerned, in case of an unaided minority educational institution, the regulatory measure of control should be minimal and the conditions of recognition as well as the conditions of affiliation to a university or board have to be complied with, but as the matter of day-to-day management, like the appointment of staff, teaching and non-teaching, and administrative control over them, the management should have the freedom and

there should not be any external controlling agency; However, a rational procedure for the selection of teaching staff and for taking disciplinary action has to be evolved by the management itself.

For redressing the grievances of employees of aided and unaided institutions who are subjected to punishment or termination from service, a mechanism will have to be evolved, and in our opinion, appropriate tribunals could be constituted, and all then such tribunals could be presided over by a judicial officer of the rank of District Judge.

The State or other controlling authorities, however, can always prescribe the minimum qualification, experience and other conditions bearing on the merit of an individual for being appointed as a teacher or a principal of any educational institution.

Regulations can be framed governing service conditions for teaching and other staff for whom aid is provided by the State, without interfering with the overall administrative control of the management over the staff.

Fees to be charged by unaided institutions cannot be regulated but no institution should charge capitation fee." (emphasis supplied)

in *Sinh Education Society & An vs. Chief Secretary, Government of NCT of Delhi & Ors.* (2010) 8 SCC 49, the Supreme Court clarified that the majority judgment in *T.M.A. Pai Foundation* was only upto paragraph 162.

In (2007) 1 SCC 389, it was clarified that paragraphs 72 and 73 of the judgment in *T.M.A. Pai Foundation* do not apply to the minority institutions.

9. The impugned provisions impinge upon the right of

minority institutions to select the principals and members of their choice. The impugned provisions clearly do not permit the minority aided institutions a free hand in selecting the persons of their choice. Even assuming that the members of the selection committee are chosen by the petitioners' members, it would make no difference for, by the impugned provisions, the persons of the petitioners' choice may well not be appointed. As held in *T.M.A. Pai Foundation*, a law which interferes with the majority institutions' choice of qualified teachers is void. So long as the teachers have the prescribed qualifications, they must be left to select the persons of their choice.

10. This brings us back to the judgment of the *Quesor Bench* of the Madras High Court in *Forum of Minority Institutions & Associations vs State of TN* (2011) 2 MLJ 241. The petitioners had challenged the UGC Regulations 2000. Clause 3 of the Annexure to the UGC Regulations 2000 pertained to the minimum qualification for appointment and career advancement of teachers in universities and colleges. Clause 6 thereof provided for selection committees recommended by UGC for posts of lecturer, university lecturer, reader, professor and principal. Although the provisions of clause 6 were different from the provisions impugned in the present case, they also provided for selection committees which included the nominees of the Vice-Chancellor and subject experts not commented with that

colleges nominated by the Chancellor of the governing body within the limits of the names approved by the Vice-Chancellor. In paragraph 10, the Division Bench noted that during the pendency of the writ petition, UGC Regulations of 2010, impugned before us had been framed. After setting out the same, the Division Bench noted that these regulations had also been challenged on the facts and grounds stated therein.

It was contended on behalf of the respondents, as noted in paragraphs 33 and 37 of the judgment that the amended Regulations of 2010 did not take away the rights of the administration of institutions as all the members of the selection committees would be from the panel of the names suggested by the concerned minority institutions.

After considering various judgments including the above judgment in *T.M.A. Pai Foundation* and the judgment of the Supreme Court in *Abanindranath Sankar Das College Society vs. State of Gujarat & Anr.* AIR 1974 SC 1398, the Division Bench held as under:-

“10. In view of the settled proposition of law, the contention of learned counsel for the University Grants Commission that by way of amendment of regulations, independence has been given to the minority institutions to select their own people without outside interference, as the right of appointment of teachers out of qualified teachers is to be left to the minority institutions, also cannot be accepted, as the process of selection of teachers cannot be (sic) regulated, as it would amount to interference to

administration of minority institutions.

61. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that regulations are in public interest to maintain standard of education and cannot be accepted as the appointments of qualified teachers as per the qualification prescribed by the University Grants Commission by the minority institutions cannot be said to violate the public interest, nor it can be said that the educational standard would not be maintained.

62. The right of minority institutions under Section 30 is absolute right being fundamental of the Constitution and therefore any regulation interfering with the right of administration would not be applicable to the minority institutions, being violative of Article 30(1) of the Constitution.

63. The contention that right to administration does not include right to misadministration also cannot be accepted as the minority institutions would be bound by qualification laid down by appointment of teachers and also would be bound to follow other statutory laws necessary for running their institutions to maintain educational standard. The only restriction placed is with regard to the right to interfere in the selection of staff of the minority institutions.

64. Once the right of appointment of teachers is taken to be the right of administration which is not even disputed by the respondents, no other conclusion than the one that the impugned regulations would not apply to minority institutions can be arrived at.

65. This Court is bound by the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court even in cases where the question is referred to Constitutional Bench as in the case of *State of Rajasthan v. R.S. Sharma and Co.* (1985) 4 SCC 353, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to consider question with regard to the applicability of law when the matter was referred to the Constitutional Bench and it was held as under.

7. It was contended before us that the question whether on the ground of absence of reasons, the award is bad per se, is pending consideration by a Constitution Bench of this Court in C.A. Nos. 3137-39 of 1988, 3148 of 1988 - *Jagat Development Authority v. First Chhokanwal Contractor*. It was hence urged that the award should await adjudication on this point by the Constitution Bench. We are unable to accept this contention. In our opinion pendency of this question should not postpone all demand by this Court. One of the cardinal principles of the administration of justice is to ensure quick disposal of disputes in accordance with law, justice and equity. In the instant case, the proceedings have been long procrastinated. Indeed, the learned Judge of the High Court, after retarding the incidents from 1975 to 1985, concluded in his judgment in March 1988 that was the end of the journey. He was wrong. That was only the end of a chapter in the journey and the appellant wants to begin another chapter in the journey on the plea that the award is not a reasoned one. The bargaining between the parties was entered into in 1974-75 but the award was made on 3.12.1988, i.e. a decade after the beginning of the transaction.

For the reasons stated, the writ petitions are allowed and declaration is issued, that the impugned regulations for constitution of selection committee shall not be applicable to the minority institutions. Consequently writ in nature of *mandamus* is issued directing the respondents to approve the selection made by the minority institutions without reference to clause 3 of annexure to UGC Regulations 2000, subject to the selected candidates fulfilling other qualifications, experience etc. No costs. Consequently all the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.

11. The Division Bench expressly noted in paragraph 11 that the 2000 Regulations had also been challenged. The operative part of the judgment specifically refers only to clause 3 of the Annexure @

The UGC Regulations of 2000 for the 2010 Regulations were brought into force during the pendency of the writ petition. Even assuming that the operative part of the judgment does not affect 2010 Regulations, the judgment read in a whole supports the petitioner's case even regarding the 2010 Regulations.

12. Of the other judgments cited upon by Mr. Chitney, we need only mention that paragraphs 89, 90, 97 to 104 and 114 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in *Sindhi Education Society v. Government (NCT of Delhi)* (2011) 8 SCC 49, support the petitioner's case.

13. The judgment of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, dated 30/11/2006 in *Jesuit & Mary College, Delhi vs. University of Delhi & Anr.* [VIII Petition (C) No 5552/2006 & CM 4348/2006 (Stay)], takes a contrary view. The impugned provision in that case was clause 7(4A) of Chapter XVIII of the Delhi University Ordinance, which provided that the selection committee should consist of -

- (i) The Chairperson of the Governing Body,
- (ii) The Principal of the concerned college,
- (iii) Two members of the Vice-Chancellor of whom one should be a subject expert,
- (iv) Two subject experts not connected with the college to be nominated by the Chairperson of the governing out of a panel approved by the Vice-Chancellor.

(v) One senior teacher/head of the Department of the concerned subject."

After referring to some of the judgment on the point the Division Bench held as under:

"26. We now turn to examine the impugned provisions in light of the petitioner's contentions. At the outset it requires to be understood that the impugned clause 7(4A) of Chapter XVIII envisages the Vice-Chancellor nominating two persons on the Selection Committee of whom one is to be a subject expert. Further the Chairperson of the Governing Body of the minority college such as the petitioner nominates two subject experts not connected with the college out of the panel of names approved by the Vice-Chancellor. As regards the first category, the University had proposed two names as subjects of Computer Science, Economic English, Maths, Sociology, Psychology, BDP, one of whom was to be the subject expert. As regards the second category, the University has prepared a panel of four names of professors. The choice of nominating two persons from the panel in the second category is still with the Chairperson of the Governing Body and it cannot be said that there is no freedom of choice with the petitioner in this regard. Two members nominated by the Vice-Chancellor out of a total of seven cannot be said to give such member any unfair advantage. As regards the first category even though both nominees of are of the vice-Chancellor, one is the subject expert who can only ensure a better quality of selection. This can by no means be said to be detrimental to the interests of the petitioner or their institution. The petitioner has not been able to demonstrate how two persons nominated by the Vice-Chancellor from amongst nine persons constituting the Selection Committee can actually override the decisions of the Selection Committee which otherwise is comprised of persons nominated by the petitioner itself, and the members of the management command a healthy and overwhelming majority.

27. The petitioner has not been able to discharge its onus of showing that Clause 7 (4A) actually infringes the rights of minorities. In our view, there is nothing to show that Clause 7(4A) actually violates Article 30 (1). *

14. We are however inclined to follow, at this stage, the judgment of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court for more than one reason.

Firstly, the judgment of the Division Bench deals with the very provisions that fall for our consideration in the present writ petition. If we were not to follow the judgment, it would lead to a situation where the provisions impugned in the writ petition would be applicable to certain States although they have been held to be ultra vires the Constitution of India. Mr. Chinnay relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in *Kesavan Bhattar v Alloy's Ltd vs Union of India* (1964) 5 SCC 254. The Supreme Court held as under :-

"22. The Court must have the requisite territorial jurisdiction. An order passed on a writ petition questioning the constitutionality of a parliamentary Act, whether interim or final, keeping in view the provisions contained in clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, will have effect throughout the territory of India subject of course to the applicability of the Act"

In any event such a situation ought, at least probably, to be void.

15. Secondly, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court has refused to follow the judgment delivered by Mathew, J and

Chandrasekhari J. (as their Lordships then were) in The Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College Society vs. State of Gujarat (1974) 1 SCC 717, a judgment of a bench of 9 learned Judges of the Supreme Court. Mathew, J. speaking for himself and Chandrasekhari J. delivered a separate judgment which, agreed with the majority view. In paragraph 182, Mathew, J. held as under :-

"182: It is upon the principal and teachers of a college that the tone and temper of an educational institution depend. On them would depend its reputation, the maintenance of discipline and its efficiency in teaching. The right to choose the principal and to have the teaching conducted by teachers appointed by the management after an overall assessment of their outlook and philosophy is perhaps the most important facet of the right to administer an educational institution. We can perceive no reason why a representative of the University nominated by the Vice-Chancellor should be on the Selection Committee for recruiting the Principal or for the insistence of head of the department besides the representative of the University being on the Selection Committee for recruiting the members of the teaching staff. So long as the persons chosen have the qualifications prescribed by the University, the choice must be left to the management. That is part of the fundamental right of the colleges to administer the educational institution established by them."

The judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court refused to follow the observations on the ground that the view of Mathew, J. and Chandrasekhari J. was not the view of the other five Judges. The Division Bench held as under :-

"15. Eng. J. (as his Lordship then was)

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discussed on this aspect and observed in para 211 (SCC, p.826) that "the mere presence of the representatives of the Vice-Chancellors, the teachers, the members of the non-teaching staff and students of the college would not impinge upon the right to administer." Here again, although there is no separate discussion on Section 33A(1)(b) it is clear in para 233 (SCC, p.835) that the provision was not held to be inapplicable to minority institutions. The other dissenting Judge, Dwiwand J., noted that (para 207, SCC, p.850) that the counsel for the petitioner "abandoned the attack against this provision."

16. Therefore by a majority of 7:2, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in *St. Xavier's* held Section 33A(1)(b) of the Gujarat University Act was violative of Article 30(1). However, of the seven that constituted the majority, only two (Mathew and Chandrachud JJ.) have subscribed to the view in para 182 that there was no reason why there should be a representative of the Vice-Chancellor on the selection committee or a head of the department for recruiting members of the teaching staff. Four of the seven judges (Ray C.J., Patil J., Jaganmohan Reddy J. and Agastya J.) came to the same conclusion for the reason that there was no indication and guidance in the Act "as to what types of persons could be nominated as the representative." Therefore, it would not be correct to proceed on the footing that the reasoning of Mathew and Chandrachud JJ. in para 182 of the judgment was also the reasoning that weighed with the four of the seven judges constituting the majority.

17. We are with great respect unable to adopt this process of reasoning. The judgment of Mathew J. and Chandrachud J. constituted part of the majority judgment. We seriously doubt whether a High Court can ignore concurrent judgment of these Lordships of the Supreme Court on the ground that the other Judges:

along with whom they consulted the majority had decided the case on different point. We are therefore not inclined to ignore the observations of Mathew, J and Chandrachud, J in The Administrator, St. Xavier's case (supra)

17. The petitioners challenged the judgment of the Delhi High Court before the Supreme Court. The appeal - Civil Appeal No. 747 of 2007 was disposed of by the following order of the Supreme Court dated 15.02.2011 -

Learned counsel for the appellants submit that in view of the 2010 UGC Regulation, this appeal has become infructuous and may be dismissed as such keeping the question of law open. He further submits that the posts of teacher may now be filled in accordance with the 2010 UGC Regulation.

We order accordingly.

The matter was therefore, not decided by the Supreme Court in view of the statement on behalf of the appellants that they would fill in the posts in accordance with the 2010 Regulations.

18. We intend staying the operation of the impugned provisions as a refusal to do so seriously hampers the functioning of the petitioners' members even on a day to day basis. The balance of convenience is in their favour especially having regard to the conditions upon which we intend granting interim relief.

19. However, as this order is passed only at the interim stage, it is necessary to protect the rights and interests of the respondents.

and their parties in the event of the petition being decided against the petitioners.

20. We are inclined to grant the protection sought on behalf of the respondents.

21. In the circumstances, the Notice of Motion is disposed of by the following order :-

(i) The notice of motion is made absolute in terms of prayer (a) and (b), which read as under :-

(a) that pending the hearing and final disposal of the Petition, the Hon'ble Court be pleased to restrain Respondent Nos.1 and 4 from acting upon para 5.1.4, 5.1.5 and 5.1.6 of the UGC Regulations dated 30th June 2010 relating to "Selection Committees and Selection Procedures" and Government Resolutions dated 15.02.2011 and 30.01.2012 (Exhibits D and E respectively) and University Circulars dated 22.02.2012 and 07.06.2012 accepting the same whilst considering appointments made by Minority educational institutions.

(b) that pending the hearing and final disposal of the Petition, the Hon'ble Court be pleased to Direct the Respondent Nos.3 to reconsider the applications for approval of staff submitted by minority educational institutions which have been disapproved only on the ground of non compliance with the selection procedure stipulated in the UGC regulation dated 30th June 2010 and the Government Resolution dated 15.02.2011 Government Resolution dated 30.01.2012 and/or University Circulars dated 22.02.2012 and 07.06.2012 accepting the same.

(ii) The petitioners' members shall inform each of the persons seeking appointments and appointed that their appointments would be

subject to the result of the writ petition.

iv) The respondents however, shall be at liberty to ratify the appointments even in the event of the petition being dismissed.

v) By availing of the benefit of this order, the petitioners and their members, agree and undertake to refund any amounts as may be directed by the Court at the final hearing of the petition.

vi) Even in the event of the petitioners being required to refund / return the grant made in respect of persons appointed pursuant to this order, the petitioners shall not in any case seek a refund thereof from them.

Stand over to 24.06.2013 for directions when the parties are at liberty to apply for a fixed date for the final hearing of the Writ Petition.

(R.Y. GANOO, J.)

(S.J. VAZIEDAR, J.)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO. 1728 OF 2001

- 1 St. Xavier's College
through its Principal
Fr. J.M. Dias,
Maharajika Marg,
Mumbai-400 001.
- 2 Maharashtra Association of Minority
Educational Institutions
& Society registered under the
Societies Registration Act, 1920
through its President and having
its office at Keshavnagar Road
Thane-401 104. - Petitioners

vs

- 1 University of Mumbai
Through its Vice-Chancellor,
Fort, Mumbai-400 023.
- 2 The Registrar,
University of Mumbai
Fort, Mumbai-400 023.
- 3 State of Maharashtra
through Government Pleader
Anand in Building, High Court,
Bombay. - Respondents

Ordinarily Sued with Mr. Jw. Chhabria for Valbooth Malviya and
Mr. Ayushi Arandpara by Federal & Resident for Petitioner
Mr. Rii Rodrigues for Respondent Nos. 1 & 2
Mr. Anay Patil, Adil Govt Pleader for Respondent No. 3

CORAM : A.A. SAYED &
 M. S. KARNIK, JJ
 DATE : 12 OCTOBER 2017

JUDGMENT (Per A.A.Sayed J)

The challenge in the Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is to the Order dated 30.05.2001 issued by the Respondent No.1 University directing reservation for students belonging to backward classes in educational institutions conducting courses in Arts, Commerce, Science and other professional courses affiliated to the Respondent No.1 University including such educational institutions established and administered by minorities.

2. The Petitioner No.1 is a College established by the Bombay Students' College Association which imparts education to students pursuing degree courses in Arts, Science and Commerce streams, registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950. The Petitioner No.2 is the

Association of the Educational Institutions registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, which are stated to have either language of minority status. It represents the Colleges enumerated in the list annexed at Exh.A to the Petition. Respondent No.1 is a University constituted under the Bombay Universities Act 1974 which was replaced by the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994. Respondent No.2 is the Registrar of the Respondent No.1 University. Respondent No.3 is the State of Maharashtra.

3. The impugned Circular stipulates reservation for students belonging to backward classes for admission to various courses to the extent of 50% of seats by implementing the reservation policy of the Government of Maharashtra as notified vide Government Resolution dated 12-07-1997. The percentage of reservation prescribed is as under:

1	S.C.	15%
2	B.T	7%
3	O.T (A)	3%
4	N.T (B)	2.5%
5	N.T (C)	1.5%
6	N.T (D)	2%
7	O.B.C.	19%

The impugned Circular makes a reference to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Shahid H. Musali and anr. Vs. State of Kerala & ors. JT 1993(4) S.C. 584 and lays down the following criteria for admission and reservation of seats in minority colleges:

(A) Fifty per cent of the total intake in the minority colleges shall be permitted to be filled up by candidates selected by the agencies of the State Government/University on the basis of controlled admission scheme.

(b) The remaining fifty per cent of the intake may be regulated by the minority colleges to admit candidates belonging to the particular religious or linguistic minority. However, the selection shall be made strictly on the basis of merit among the candidates seeking admission to the institutions. Such merit shall be determined on the basis of the academic performance at the qualifying examination, or on the basis of any objective test that the institution might itself apply to determine such relative and competing merits, or on the basis of performance of the results of the selection tests if such test is held by the State Government/University. It is optional for the minority colleges to adopt any one of these three modes and apply it uniformly.

8. On 16-06-2001 when the Petition came up for admission, the learned Counsel on behalf of the Respondent No.1 University stated before the Court that the impugned Circular relates only to seats reserved for minority quota and therefore various instructions contained in the impugned Circular will not apply to the minority

quorum of 2001) in the decision of the Supreme Court in **St. Stephen's College vs. University of Delhi, 1992 (1) SCC 588**. On 06 June 2002 in a Notice of Motion No. 231 of 2002 issued out by the Petitioner, the Court passed the following order:

"The Petitioner has permitted to admit minority students in 42 per cent quota of seats, strictly on the basis of merit amongst the minority students and 3 per cent seats are reserved for the categories namely (i) Handicapped Students (ii) Children of Children of Freedom Fighters (iii) Children of Defence Personnel (iv) Children of Parents transferred while working with Central/State Government (v) Sports District, State and National (vi) Students having disability and exceptional performance in class/12th securing merit in 10th. The balance 50 per cent seats should be filled in either through a common entrance test held by the University/State or any such agency or to the extent of such common entrance test, provided, the admissions will be based on the merit of performance in the qualifying examination for the admission in such cases by non-minority students. It is made clear that there will be no reservation whatsoever with regard to balance 50 per cent seats (i.e. non-minority quota) however, the candidates from reserved category would be entitled to compete with the other students strictly on merit for vacant seats. The reserved courses to be passed submit that in some of the minority institutions, minority reserved category students have been admitted on the basis of reservation to non-minority seats. If any such admissions were traced to reserved category students till yesterday, the same shall not be considered."

The aforesaid order was corrected by Court on 23 June 2002 and it was clarified that the 3% reservations for 10% categories will be out

of the 50% seats in open category and not in the 50% seats meant for minority quota.

5 We call upon learned Additional Government Pleader to state the stand of the Respondent No-3, State of Maharashtra as to whether reservation policy mentioned in the Government Resolution dated 11/07/1997 applied in the minority institutions and whether ACP in minority does submit that there is nothing in the Government Resolution dated 11/07/1997 which states that the reservation policy is applicable to minority Educational Institutions.

6 The issue for consideration before the Court essentially is whether there can be any reservation for backward class of students in minority colleges. There is no content in the Petition wherein the Petitioner No.1 or the minor colleges of the Petitioner No.2-Associates, as list thereof is annexed to Petition, are asked or invited through the Petition which was filed in the year 2001, to submit on the issue that there can be any reservation for backward class students in the 50% minority quota. The issue will also be required to be considered in the backdrop of the

subsequent events after filing of the Petition and in particular on the inclusion of Article 28(5) which was inserted to the Constitution of India vide the Constitutional (Ninety-four) Amendment Act 2005 and the decisions of the Apex Court.

7. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties. We have perused the following judgments cited by the learned Counsel on behalf of the Petitioner:

- i) Khan Abdul Jamil Abdul Razzak Vs. Mohammed Iqbal Saboo Siddik Palyeshani, 1985 MHLJ 400.
- ii) St. Stephen's College vs. University of Oduv (1982) 1 SCC 588.
- iii) St. Francis Lal Spina Education Society Nagpur & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra (2001) 3 TMLJ 261.
- iv) T.M.A. Pai Foundation & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2002) 8 SCC 481.
- v) P.A. Hamidi & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2005) 6 SCC 537.
- vi) Acharya Kunder Thakur Vs. University of Uda and Ors. (2001) 4 Supreme Court Cases 1.
- vii) Secretary, Mamankani Syam Canara College Vs. T. Jesu & Ors. (2007) 1 SCC 380.
- viii) Sindhi Education Society & Anr. Vs. Chief Secretary, Government of NCT of Delhi & Ors. 2010 (8) SCC 89.

(a) Pravasi Educational and Cultural Trust Vs. Union of India
[2011] 4 SCC 1

8 Article 30 of the Constitution provides for right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions. It reads thus:

“30 (1) All minorities whether based on religion or language shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.”

(2A) -

“(2) The State shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions, discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or language.”

Article 29 of the Constitution deals with protection of interests of minorities. It reads as under:

“29 (1) -

“(2) No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them.”

Article 15 of the Constitution prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. Article 15(4) is relevant for our purposes. It reads thus:

Article 15(3). Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.

The legal position prior to insertion of Article 15(5) of the Constitution

9. In St. Stephen's College Vs. University of Delhi (1981) 1 Ver 5-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court by majority held as follows:

“10. The right to accept students for admission is a part of administration. It is indeed an important form of administration. The power also could be regulated but the regulation must be enforceable just like any other regulation. It should be confined to the welfare of the majority institutions so far the detriment of minority is not too far...”

11. Since the宗旨 of State aid does not impair the rights in Article 30(1), the State can lay down reasonable conditions for granting grants-in-aid and for its proper utilisation. The State has the power to control private institutions so long as their rights under Article 30(1). (See: In Kerala Education Bill case (1958) 3 SCR 686 – AIR 1958 SC 686) and Scrutiny case (1969) 3 SCR 617 – AIR 1969 SC 617.) In the latter case, the Court observed (in SCR pp. 858-57) that the regulation which may lawfully be imposed as a condition of receiving grant must be directed to making the institution an effective / genuine educational institution. The regulation cannot change the character of the minority institution. Such regulations must satisfy a dual test, the test of reasonableness, and the test that it is regulation of the educational character of the institution. It

shall be confined to making the institution an effective vehicle of education for the minority community or other persons who come to it. It is thus evident that the rights under Article 30(1) cannot be restricted merely when minority institutions have the government's approval.

102. In the light of all these principles and facts, a fully valid if the imposition which the Commission attaches to restrictive measures to minorities under Article 30(1), the minority aided educational institutions are entitled to retain their community character, to maintain the minority character of the institutions subject of course to conformity with the governing statute. The State may regulate the intake in the institution with due regard to the need of the community in the area which the institution is required to serve. But in no case such regulation shall exceed 25 per cent of the total admission. The minority institutions shall retain ownership at least 75 per cent of the annual expenditure of salaries of employees other than for statutory obligations. The admission of other community candidates shall be done purely on the basis of merit.

(emphasis supplied)

10 **III T.M.A. Pai Foundation & Anr Vs. State of Maharashtra &**

018. (supra) (minor questions were referred to the 11-Judge Constitution

Bench of the Supreme Court. Some of the questions and answers therein

in the minority judgment which are material in the context of the present

case are extracted hereunder:

***Q. 4.** Whether the admission of students to minority educational institution, whether aided or unaided, may be regulated by the State Government or by the University to which the institution is affiliated?

A. Admission of students to unaided minority educational institutions or schools and universities/collages where the scope for merit based selection is practically not, cannot be regulated by the State or university concerned, except the providing the qualifications and minimum conditions of eligibility in the interests of academic standards.

The right of minority students being an essential aspect of the right to admission educational institutions of their choice as contemplated under Article 31 of the Constitution, the State Government or the university may not be contract in violation with this right as long as the admission to the specified educational institutions is on a non-quota basis and the merit is absolutely taken care of. The merit to admissions not being absolute, there could be temporary measures for increasing educational standards and maintaining excellence therein, and it is more so, if the matter of admissions to educational institutions

A minority institution does not permit as he said, the women quota but is, enforced by the institution. An equal minority educational institution, provision could be made to have the right of admission of students belonging to the minority group and at the same time, would be required to admit a reasonable number of non-minority students so that the rights under Article 30(1) are not substantially impaired and further the citizens rights under Article 29(1) are not infringed. What would be a reasonable criteria, would vary from the type of institution, the course of education for which admission is being sought and other factors like educational needs. The State Government contended that to fulfil the promise of the non-minority students to be admitted by the right of the above observations. Consideration of merit is not amongst the applicants belonging to the minority group could be required. In the case of aided professional institutions, it can also be stipulated that filling of the common vacancies that held by the State agency is necessary to seek admission. As regards non-minority students who are eligible to seek admission for the remaining seats, admission should normally be on the basis of the common entrance test held by the State agency followed by counselling wherever it exists.

Q. 5(a) Whether the minority rights provisions and admission educational institutions of their choice will include the procedure and method of admission and selection of students?

A. A minority institution may have its own provision and method of admission as well as selection of students. But such a procedure must be fair and transparent and the selection of students in professional and higher educational colleges should be on the basis of merit. The procedure adopted or selection made should not be tantamount to discrimination. Even an unaided minority institution right does ignore the merit of the students for

merit, who exercising the right of admission to the colleges attend in at that time, the institution will be in position to achieve excellence.

Q. 5(b) Whether the minority institutions, right of admission of students and to lay down procedure and method of admission, if any, would be affected in any way by the receipt of State aid?

A. While giving aid to professional institutions, it would be permissible for the authority giving aid to prescribe the rules or conditions, the conditions on the basis of which admission will be granted to different types colleges by virtue of merit coupled with the reservation policy of the State but not minority status. The merit may be determined either through a common entrance test conducted by the university or the Government concerned followed by counselling or on the basis of an entrance test conducted by individual institutions — the method to be followed is for the authority or the Government to decide. The authority may also direct that merit in regard to admission is granted to an aided professional institution on the basis of merit. In the case of such institutions, it will be permissible for the Government or the authority to provide that consideration should be given to the weaker sections of the society.

Q. 5. (c) Whether the minority provisions which regulate the locus of administration the control over educational agencies, control over governing bodies, conditions of affiliation including recognition/withdrawal thereof, and appointment of staff, employees, teachers and principals including their service conditions and payment of fees, etc. would interfere with the right of administration of minorities?

A. So far as the statutory provisions regarding the locus of administration are concerned, in case of an unaided minority educational institution, the regulatory measures of control should be minimal and the conditions of recognition as well as the conditions of affiliation to a university or board have to be complied with, but in the matter of day-to-day management, like the appointment of staff, teaching and

the teaching and administrative control over them, the management should have the freedom and there should not be any external controlling agency. However, a national procedure for the selection of teaching staff and for taking disciplinary action has to be evolved by the management itself.

For redressing the grievances of employees of aided and unaided institutions who are subjected to punishment or termination from service, a machinery will have to be evolved, and in our opinion, appropriate tribunal could be constituted and all such tribunals could be presided over by a judicial officer of the rank of District Judge.

The State or other controlling authorities, however, can always prescribe the minimum qualification, experience and other conditions leading on the merit of an individual for being appointed as a teacher or a principal of any educational institution.

Regulations can be framed governing service conditions for teaching and other staff for whom aid is provided by the State without interfering with the overall administrative control of the management over the staff.

Fees to be charged by unaided institutions cannot be regulated but the institution should charge capitation fee.

Q. 8. Whether the judgment given by the Court in *St. Stephen's College Case* [(1992) 1 SCC 558] (St. Stephen's College v. University of Delhi) is correct? If no, what would be?

A. The judgment given by the Court in *St. Stephen's College Case* [(1992) 1 SCC 558] is correct, as indicated in the *Education Manual*. But percentage cannot be regulated. It has to be left to institutions to provide a reasonable percentage (more or less) to the type of reservation, decisions and educational needs of minorities.

Q. 9. Whether the decision of the Court in *Uma Kulkarni, I.P. v. State of A.P.* [(1993) 1 SCC 655] (except where it holds that primary education is a fundamental right) and the scheme framed thereunder require reconsideration/revision and if yes, what?

A. The scheme framed by the Court in *Univ. Krishna* case [(1992) 1 SCC 643] and the decision to impose the same, except where it holds that primary education is a fundamental right is unconstitutional. However, the principle that there should not be capitation fee or profiteering is correct. Reasonable surplus to meet cost of expansion and improvement of facilities does not constitute profiteering.⁷

(originals impound)

11. In *Islamic Academy of Education vs. State of Karnataka & Ors.* [(2002) 11 SC 1001] the 3-Judge Commission Bench of the Supreme Court has observed that the Bench was constituted so that doubt/nominism if any, in the judgment of the 11-Judge Bench in *T.M.A. Pai Foundation & Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors.* could be clarified.

12. In *P.A. Inamdar & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors.* [(2002) 11 SC 1002] the 7-Judge Commission Bench of the Apex Court observed as under:

*2. The events following *Hindu Academy* [(2003) 5 SCC 437] judgment show that some of the main questions have remained unsettled even after the course undertaken by the Commission Bench in *Islamic Academy* [(2003) 6 SCC 477] in consonance of the seven-Judge Bench decision in *Pai Foundation* [(2002) 6 SCC 491]. A few of these unsettled questions are also other aspects of clarification are before us calling for attention by the Bench of seven Judges which we hopefully propose to fix.

The questions spelled out by orders of reference

27. In the light of the two orders of reference, referred to in paras 25 and 26 above, we invite our attention to the

QUESTIONER HAS THE UNDERSTANDING THAT, ACCORDING TO THE ABOVE PARAGRAPHS.

(1) Is it still valid only the State regulate admissions made by unaided (minority or non-minority) educational institutions? Can the State enforce its policy of reservation and affirmative to itself any manner institution in such institutions?

(2) Whether unaided (minority and non-minority) educational institutions are free to decide their own admission procedure or whether the direction made in *Minnis Academy [(2003) 8 SCC 487]* is compulsory binding on institution run by the State or association of institutions and to draw therefrom the students entitled to admission in such institutions, can be assumed in light of the law laid down in *For Foundation [(2002) 8 SCC 481]*?

(3) Whether *State Academy [(2003) 8 SCC 487]* could have limited (quotas) of the number of regulating the fee payable by the students in the educational institutions?

(4) Can the admission procedure and fee structure be regulated or taken over by the Commission created to be constituted by *State Academy [(2003) 8 SCC 487]*?

Q. L. Unaided educational institutions: Appropriation of quota by the State and enforcement of reservation policy

116. First, we shall deal with minority unaided institutions.

117. We have in the earlier part of the judgment referred to *Kerala Education Bill [(1958) SCR 905]* and *State SC [(55)]* and suggest the three categories of minority educational institutions as classified and deal with them. The seven Judge Bench decision in *Kerala Education Bill [(1958) SCR 905]* and *State SC [(55)]* still holds the field and has met the approval of the seven-Judge Bench in *For Foundation [(2002) 8 SCC 481]*. We will not add more what *For Foundation [(2002) 8 SCC 481]* has already said about such category of institutions.

(i) Minority educational institution, unaided and unrecognised

118. *For Foundation [(2002) 8 SCC 481]* is unanimous on the view that the right to establish and manage an institution, the right to employ as Article 30(1) of the Constitution, comprises of the following rights: (a) to admit students; (b) to set up a reservation fee structure; (c) to constitute a governing body; (d) to appoint staff

teaching and not teaching) and (c) to some action of these in violation of duty on the part of any of the employees. (Para 50)

119. A minority educational institution may choose not to take any part from the State and thus not seek any recognition or affiliation. It may be imparting such education and may have students learning such knowledge that do not stand in need of any recognition. Such institutions would be those where standards are imposed by the sale of resources and learning is only for the sake of learning and acquiring knowledge. Obviously, such institutions would fall in the category of those who would exercise their right under the protection and privilege conferred by Article 30(1) "in their regard control" untrammelled by any restrictions excepting those which are of essential interest based on considerations such as public safety, national security and national integrity or are aimed at preventing exploitation of students of the teaching community. Such institutions cannot be liable to any action which is violative of any law of the land.

120. They are free to admit all students of their own minority community if they so choose to do. (Para 145 The Fundamental (2002) II S.C. 481.)

(f) Minority unaided educational institutions asking for affiliation or recognition

121. Absence of recognition by the State or the Board or the university competent to do so, cannot in itself justify on the ground that the institution is a minority educational institution. However, the urge to seek for affiliation or recognition arises in the concept of regulation by way of laying down conditions prescribed with the requirement of meeting them, existence of regulated and preventing standardisation. For example, provisions can be made relating to the quality of the teachers by prescribing the minimum qualifications that they must possess and the courses of studies and curricula. The existence of infrastructure sufficient for its growth can be included as a prerequisite to the grant of recognition or affiliation. However, there cannot be interference in the day-to-day administration. The essential standards of the institution, including admission of students, retention of staff and the quality of the to be taught, cannot be regulated. (Para 55, 56 and 57 paras 107-110) (2002) II S.C. 481.]

122. Apart from the generalised position of law that the right to admission does not include the right to readmission, an Additional source of power to regulate by imposing conditions accompanying admission or recognition exists. A balance has to be struck between the two objectives: (i) that of preserving the standard of excellence of the institution and (ii) that of preserving the right of the majority to establish and maintain an educational institution. Subject to a consideration of the two objectives, any regulation accompanying admission or recognition must satisfy the right test, (i) the test of reasonableness and rationality, (ii) the test that the regulation would be conducive to making the institution an effective vehicle of education for the majority community or other persons who wish to do so, and (iii) that there is no conflict with the provision contained by Article 30(1) of the Constitution that is by having the regulation the essential character of the institution being a minority educational institution, is not alien to it. (Para 122, *Per Foundation* [(2002) 1 SCC 481].)

(iii) Minority educational institutions receiving State aid

123. Conditions which can normally be permitted to be imposed on the educational institutions receiving the grant must be related to the proper utilisation of the grant and fulfilment of the objectives of the grant without causing the minority status of the educational institution to be hampered. (Para 123, *Per Foundation* [(2002) 1 SCC 481] para para 143 (more or). All aided institutions are red figure as per section 102 called upon to deal with their status we have the conclusion of that only

124. So far as acceptance of grants by the State and maintenance of its reservation policy is concerned, we do not see much of a difference between non-minority and minority educational institutions. We find great force in the submission made on behalf of the petitioners that the State has no power to wind up, withdrawing or curbing or curbing professional educational institutions, by having a power of veto between the management and the State. The State cannot limit or curtail educational institutions which receive aid and from the State to implement the State policy of reservation for granting admission or human percentage of seats in an any institution except when,

125. As per the understanding, visible in the judgment in *Pai Foundation* [(2002) 8 SCC 481] vis-à-vis the Constitution Bench Decision in *Kerala Education Bill* [(1958) SCR 954, AIR (1958) SC 954] which was approved by the Foundation [(2002) 8 SCC 481] in their writings which would allow the State to regulate or control admissions in the limited professional educational institutions so as to compel them to give up a share of the available seats to the candidates chosen by the State, in effect, was being the seats available to be filled up at its discretion in such private institutions. This would amount to reservation of seats which has been specifically disapproved in *Pai Foundation* [(2002) 8 SCC 481]. Such reservation of seats in State-run or reserved reservation policy of the State in private self-governing professional institutions, the acts constituting serious encroachment on the right and autonomy of private professional educational institutions. Such encroachment of State acts also not be held to be a regulatory measure in the interest of the public within the meaning of Article 30(2) or a reasonable restriction within the meaning of Article 19(1) of the Constitution. Merely because the resources of the State in providing professional education are limited, private educational institutions which intend to provide better professional education, cannot be forced by the State to make admissions available on the basis of reservation policy to less meritorious candidates. Unaided institutions, as they are not deriving any aid from State funds, can have their own admissions. If fair, transparent, non-exploitative and based on merit.

126. The observations in para 44 of the majority opinion in *Pai Foundation* [(2002) 8 SCC 481] in which the learned counsel for the petitioners have been much at variance in their submissions, according to us, are not to be read narrowly from other parts of the main judgment. A true construction, contained in certain paragraphs of the judgment in *Pai Foundation* [(2002) 8 SCC 481] if read in isolation, appears conflicting or incongruous with each other. But if the observations made, and the conclusions derived are read as a whole, the judgment, declares that State-run limited private educational institutions, if reservation and reservation policy of the State, reaching relevant parts of the judgment on which learned counsel have made comments, and certain comments and taking the whole judgment in the light of previous judgments of the Court, which have been approved in *Pai*

FOUNDAION (2002) II SCC 481]] in the impugned private observations in para 62 merely dealt limited private institutions in relation to the exercise of admission by voluntarily agreeing for self-storing with the State by allowing admission to an common entrance test of the State. There are also observations saying that they they from the own policy to give freedom and scholarship to the needy and poor students or adopt a policy in line with the reservation policy of the State to cater to the educational needs of the weaker and poorer sections of the society.

127. However, in Para FOUNDATION (2002) II SCC 481] states in the majority or by the minority opinion. Here we found are identified the various real sharing along by the State on limited private professional educational institutions and reservation policy of the State to SMC quota with of management, etc.

128. We make it clear that the observations in Para Foundation (2002) II SCC 481] in para 69 and other paragraphs remaining portion of paragraph of para are to be read and understood in positive conformation arrangements which can be reached between unaided private professional institutions and the State.

129. In Para Foundation (2002) II SCC 481] the Court very clearly that at several places (and limited professional institutions should be given positive liberty to determination of admission procedure and fee structure. State regulation should be minimal and only with a view to maintain fairness and transparency in admission procedure and to check exploitation of the students by charging exorbitant money or exorbitant fees.

130. For the aforesaid reasons, we cannot approve of the scheme evolved in Alpine Academy (2003) II SCC 697 to the extent it allows the State to intervene for real sharing between the management and the State for the benefit of the needs of such State, as the unaided private educational institutions of both minority and community categories. This part of the judgment in Alpine Academy (2003) II SCC 697 is our considered opinion. (We did not show the correct law and the correct to Para Foundation (2002) II SCC 481]

132. Our answer to the first question is that neither the policy of reservation nor the reservation of seats for the benefit of persons of backward classes only the project and to be appropriated by the State in a manner or proportionately situated educational institutions. Affirmative institutions are free to admit students of their own choice including students of non-reserved community as also members of their own community from other States, both to a limited extent only and not in a manner and to such an extent that this remedy constitutional violation exists in fact. If they do so, they lose the protection of Article 30(1).

(emphasis applied)

13. From the enunciation of the discussed above, what emerges is that prior to the insertion of Article 15(5) to the Constitution so far as aided minority institutions were concerned, the reservation policy of the State could be enforced only to the extent of non-reserved quota of numbers as prescribed by the authorities.

The legal position post insertion of Article 15(5) of the Constitution (w.e.f. 20-01-2006)

14. The judgments in T.M.A. Pai Foundation & Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (supra) and P.A. Inamdar & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (supra) clearly laid down that the State cannot enforce its reservation policy and insist on reservation seats for

Backward Class citizens in private unaided educational institutions (minority and non-minority) The above rulings disabled the State from imposing reservation policy in unaided institutions as observed in paragraph 54 of the Constitutional Bench Judgment of the Apex Court in Ashoka Kumar Thakur vs. Union of India (1997). The Constitution was accordingly amended by adding sub-clause (B) in Article 15 by Constitution (Ninety-third Amendment) Act, 2005 which came into effect from 20.11.2006. Article 15(5) reads as follows:

"Article 15(5) Nothing in this article or in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of article 19 shall prevent the State from making any special provision, by law, for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Caste in the Scheduled Tribes in so far as such special provisions relate to their admission to educational institutions (including private educational institutions, whether aided or unaided) by the State other than the minority educational institutions referred to in clause (1) of article 19."

The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Constitution (Ninety-third Amendment) Act, 2005 reads as follows:

"At present, the number of seats available in aided or State-maintained institutions, particularly in respect of professional education, is small in comparison to those in private unaided institutions."

To provide the educational advancement of the socially and educationally backward classes of citizens in the OBCs in the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in matters of admission of students belonging to those categories in various educational institutions other than the Minority Educational Institutions referred to in Clause (1) of Article 29 of the Constitution, it is proposed to amend Article 15. The new Clause (5) shall enable Parliament as well as the State legislatures to make special provisions for the purposes mentioned above.

(unofficial report)

15 In *Ashoka Kumar Thakur Vs. Union of India* (supra) the Constitution (Thirty-third Amendment) Act, 2005 was challenged apart from the challenge to the Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act, 2006. The 5-Judge Constitution Bench by majority held as follows:

*108. The Constitution (Thirty-third Amendment) Act, 2005 by which Clause (5) was added to Article 15 of the Constitution, is an enabling provision which states that nothing in Article 15 or in sub-section (ii) of Clause (1) of Article 15 shall prevent the State from making any special provision by law, for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes insofar as such special provisions relate to their admission to the educational institutions, whether public educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the State. Of course, minority educational institutions referred to in Clause (1) of Article 29 are excluded. Thus, the newly added Clause (5) of Article 15 is meant to be applied to educational institutions whether aided or unaided, in other words, the newly added constitutional provision would enable the State to make any special provision by law for admission in private educational institutions whether aided or unaided.

126. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional interpretation that when construing the provisions of the Constitution, effect shall be given to all the provisions of the Constitution and no provision shall be interpreted in a manner as to negate any other provision of the Constitution operative in case of the violation of fundamental

will be excluded under Article 15(A), they could have very well limited Article 15(A) of the Constitution. Minority institutions are also entitled to the exercise of fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution, whether they be subject or limited. But in the case of Article 15(B) the minority educational institutions, whether subject or limited, are excluded from the purview of Article 15(A) of the Constitution.

127. Another contention raised by the petitioners, namely, is that the exclusion of minority institutions under Article 15(A) itself is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was contended that the exclusion by itself is not severable from the rest of the provision. This plea also is not tenable because the minority institutions have been given a separate treatment in Article 15(B) of the Constitution. Such discrimination has been found to be in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. The exclusion of minority educational institutions from Article 15(A) is in conformity with the language of Article 15(B) of the Constitution. Moreover, both Article 15(A) and 15(B) are operative and the plea of non-severability is not applicable.

128. The learned Single Judge of the High Court and learned counsel Mr. Sushil Kumar Jain appearing for the petitioners contended that the Constitution (Thirty-third Amendment) would violate the primary principles enshrined in Articles 14, 19 and 21 and thereby the "Golden Triangle" of these three articles could be adversely affected. The learned counsel also contended that exclusion of minorities from the operation of Article 15(A) is also violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. We do not find much force in this contention. It has been held that Article 15(A) and Article 15(B) are not exceptions to Article 15(1) and Article 19(1) respectively, if any law is enacted that if at all there is any violation of Article 14 by any other equality provision, the affected aggrieved applicant should have approached the Court to vindicate their rights. No such petition has been filed before this Court. Therefore, we hold that the exclusion of minority educational institutions from Article 15(A) is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The minority educational institutions, by themselves, are a separate class and their rights are protected by other constitutional provisions.

221. The Constitution (Thirty-third Amendment) Act, 2005, does not violate the "basic structure" of the Constitution as far as it

maintain in the State maintained institutions and aided educational institutions. Question whether the Constitution (Ninth Schedule) Amendment Act, 2005 would be constitutionally valid or not so far as private unaided educational institutions are concerned, is not open to be decided in an appropriate case.
 (Para 120 to 125 and 108 to 111)*

(emphasis supplied)

Thus, the 5-Judge Constitution Bench in the instant case of **Ashoka Kumar Thakur vs. Union of India** (supra) by majority (3:1) upheld the constitutional validity of Article 15(5) so far as State maintained and aided educational institutions are concerned. However, the constitutional validity of Article 15(5) so far as private unaided education institutions are concerned, was not considered and was left open to be decided in an appropriate case. His Lordship Justice Dalveer Bhandaal in his judgment (minority view) however considered the said issue and held that Article 15(5) was not constitutionally valid even so far as private unaided education institutions are concerned, which view was overruled in **Pravali Educational and Cultural Trust vs. Union of India** (supra). So far as private educational institutions are concerned, the Constitution Bench has held that such minority educational institutions, whether aided or unaided, are excluded from the purview of Article 15(5) of the Constitution.

clause (f) of Article 15 and Article 21-A of the Constitution is valid and does not violate the basic structure of the Constitution in the light of well settled test by the persons (listed) mentioned. The constitutional validity of clause (f) of Article 15 and of Article 21-A has to be decided by the Constitution Bench.

5. Hence we are called upon to decide in this reference the following two substantial questions of law:

5.1 (i) Whether by inserting clause (f) in Article 15 of the Constitution by the Constitution (Ninety-Ninth Amendment) Act, 2005 Parliament has altered the basic structure or framework of the Constitution?

5.2 (ii) Whether by inserting Article 21-A of the Constitution by the Constitution (Eighty-Sixth Amendment) Act, 2002 Parliament has altered the basic structure or framework of the Constitution?

21. We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and we find that the object of clause (f) of Article 15 is to ensure that State do not discriminate on the basis of socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Caste and the Scheduled Tribes in state or in educational institutions which they occupy. Substantial evidence related to clause (f) of Article 15 of the Constitution. This will be clear from the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act, which also became the Constitution (Ninety-Ninth Amendment) Act, 2005 attached herewith.

22. Greater access to higher education, including professional education, to a larger number of students belonging to the socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes, has been a matter of major concern. At present, the number of such students of state or State maintained institutions, particularly in respect of professional education, is small in comparison to those in private unaided institutions.

38. We accordingly find that some of the rights under Article 14, 19(1)(a) and 21 of the Constitution have been abrogated by clause (5) of Article 15 of the Constitution and the step taken by Parliament. I in *Asokan Kumar Thakur v. Union of India* that the impingement of supervisory and financial institutions by the Twenty-third Amendment has abrogated Article 19(1)(g) & some portion of the Constitution is not correct, instead, we hold that the Constitution (Twenty-third Amendment) Act, 2008 inserting clause (5) of Article 15 of the Constitution is valid.

55. — In our view if the 2009 Act is made applicable to minority schools, then it would curtail the right of the minority under Article 30(1) of the Constitution will be abrogated. Therefore, the 2009 Act should not be made applicable to minority schools, entered in clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution is ultra vires the Constitution. We go back of the view that the majority judgment of the Court in *Society for Unassisted Private Schools v. Rajasthan v. Union of India, 2 (2012) 6 SCC 1* should be a hold, that the 2009 Act is application to small minority schools is not correct.

56. In the result, we hold that the Constitution (Twenty-third Amendment) Act, 2008 inserting clause (5) of Article 15 of the Constitution and the Constitution (Twenty-third Amendment) Act, 2002 inserting Article 21-A of the Constitution do not alter the basic structure of framework of the Constitution and are constitutionally valid. We also hold that the 2009 Act is not ultra vires Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. We however hold that the 2009 Act is ultra vires as it applies to minority schools, aided or unaided, except under clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution is ultra vires the Constitution.

(withdrew signature)

The 5-Judge Constituent Bench in the abovesaid case of *Pravara Educational Trust vs. Union of India* (supra), has thus held that minority educational institutions, which are attached, are kept outside the financing power of the State under Article 15(5) of the Constitution.

17. To sum up, upon insertion of Article 15(5) to the Constitution, the minority educational institutions (both aided and unaided) are exempted from enforcement of the reservation policy of the State in respect of backward class of citizens, as interpreted by the judgments of the Constitution Benches of the Apex Court in Ashoka Kumar Thakur vs. Union of India (supra) and Prasad Educational and Cultural Trust vs. Union of India (supra), which upholding the validity of Article 15(5) of the Constitution

18. The upshot of the aforesaid discussion is that the impugned Circular to the extent providing for reservation of seats for students of backward class for admission in minority colleges cannot be sustained. The impugned Circular is violative of Article 30(1) read with Article 15(5) of the Constitution of India. Hence, the following order:

ORDER

- i) The Writ Petition is allowed.
- ii) The impugned Circular dated 30/05/2003 in the extent it provides 50% reservation of seats for backward class

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Students for admission to all courses will therefore be the
impaired. Circular in minority colleges is quoted and set
aside

iii) rule is made absolute accordingly. There shall be no order
as to costs.

iv) It is clarified that we have not gone into the issue whether the
members of the Publishers Association, let alone, it
imposed to the Author, and in fact minority institutions and
the verification in that regard is left to the Respondents.

(M.S.KARNIK, J.)

(A.A.SAYED, J.)